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Jon Doyle presents a very ambitious idea in this book. It is that the ideas of classical mechanics are directly
applicable to psychology, social sciences, economics, and AI—and not just as metaphors or analogies. Thus F = ma
is proposed with definitions of force, mass, and acceleration. Newton’s third law, of equal and opposite reactions, is
also proposed to apply.
We are unable to see it.
Doyle uses his previous work on reason maintenance systems (RMS). Here’s what he says about it.
“In summary, the mechanical interpretation of the RMS views the RMS as a body interacting with its environment.
The conclusions of the RMS constitute its position. The changes in these conclusions, which the RMS reports to
its environment, constitute its velocity. The base reasons posited by the environment constitute its mass, which we
view as a vector quantity rather than a scalar. The RMS obeys Euler’s law of the balance of linear momentum,
the familiar equation f = p˙. Indeed the changes wrought by the environment on the RMS mass and position
are naturally interpreted as forces. More importantly, each reason used by the RMS in constructing its position
description determines a force, and so acts as a component of the stress suffered by the RMS body. The equilibrium
states computed by the RMS, which satisfy the conditions expressed by the reasons they contain, in turn bear a
natural interpretation as the relaxed states of an elastic material. This interpretation extends to view the total force
on the RMS as satisfying Cauchy’s first law relating stress, body force and momentum flux.” pp. 233 and 234.
We are unable to accept this interpretation of RMS as summarized above.
Next we contrast the traditional modeling of states (both mental and physical) in AI with Doyle’s proposal.
In the traditional model the basic primitives are events, and situations, where a set of fluents hold. An event at a
situation, gives a new situation where some fluents have changed value. An underlying default is inertia, that only
the specified fluents change. The notion of fluent (and the word) and the above common sense law of inertia were
explicitly intended to get as much as 1960s AI could from Newton’s ideas.
Doyle considers a different set of underlying primitives, and a different underlying default. He divides fluents into
two sets, which he calls Mass and Position. It is unclear whether these are disjoint. Mass and Position values are drawn
from the same space, and each can be thought of as a set of assertions. Notably, neither is logically closed, and the
assertions can include rules as well as propositions.
The key difference between these two sets of beliefs are that Mass is changed by Learning, while Position is
changed by Reasoning. A notion of derivative is introduced, so that the derivative of Position, (called Velocity) is the
set of fluents changed between this situation and the previous.
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1238 Book review / Artificial Intelligence 170 (2006) 1237–1238Rather than events, which lead from one situation to the next, forces determine the next state. Like some treatments
of events, multiple forces can act at the same time. The critical connection between forces and the two sets of beliefs
is that forces are the derivative of (the pair of sets of changes between) the Mass and Velocity at one state and the next.
The use of Velocity, rather than just Position seems arbitrary. The basic idea that there are two types of belief, and
that reasoning changes one, while pure learning changes the other, while other events can change both seems intuitive.
What is strange in Doyle’s work is the idea that events/forces change the velocity (or rate of change of belief) rather
than the set of beliefs themselves.
In order to pursue the interpretation as mechanics, this extra level of differentiation is needed. His new concept of
momentum is a pair (of mass and velocity) of sets of propositions, rather than the simpler notion in mechanics where
mass is a scalar. There seems something wrong with the analogy, and Doyle repeatedly recognizes that this is the area
that requires the most change.
Momentum being conserved is now very peculiar, as this means that the rate of change in (reasoned) beliefs is
constant when no force is applied (and no learning takes place). Perhaps the reasoner keeps reasoning at a steady rate?
No, the formalism has a notion of some beliefs forever toggling, to allow for this rate of constant change, “repetitive
reversals correspond to inertial change” (p. 36). A steady increase in conclusions would not count as constant velocity
as set comparison is used, not cardinality when measuring size.
We have emphasized the areas in which we fundamentally disagree with Doyle’s proposal. There are some areas
in which others will find Doyle’s work useful. His history of mechanics is interesting and so are the philosophical
conclusions he draws from it.
Perhaps his most useful technical contribution is likely to be his unified treatment of systems involving both con-
tinuous and discrete change.
Personal correction: McCarthy was not Alonzo Church’s student but Solomon Lefschetz’s. His preference for logic
as the basis for AI arose later.
